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Introduction 
 
   The existence of a concept of “abuse of rights” in the case-law of the ECJ 
concerning different areas –  provision of services; common agricultural policy; 
company law, tax legislation - has been attracting, since the 1990s, much attention 
and debate in the scholarly literature all over Europe
1
.   
      In effect, the circumstance that the ECJ, in a number of rulings in these different 
areas, has been using not only the words “abuse” or “abusive purpose” but also the 
words “fraud” and “circumvention”, provides scope for debate about these concepts 
(e.g., as to whether “circumvention” can arise without “abuse”)2, and as to whether 
the concept of “abuse” emerging in one area of EU law coincides with or is different 
from the concept of “abuse” emerging in other areas of EU law3. In trying to deal with 
these two fundamental issues, the academic debate has been focusing on several 
questions (the responses to which affect the solution to these two fundamental issues): 
whether it is possible to assert the existence of an anti-abuse principle in EU law; 
whether such a principle would be a general principle or merely a principle of 
interpretation; the scope of its application; the consequences of its introduction both in 
the EU and in Member States' legal systems
4
 .           
    The present paper aims at contributing to the debate on these points and thus at 
contributing to extrapolate a response to the two ultimate issues highlighted above, by 
                                                 
1  Among the numerous contributions: L.Brown, Is there a general principle of abuse of rights 
in European Community Law? In Heukel and Curtin (Eds.), Institutional Dynamics of European 
Integration, Vol. II (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 511-525, at 513-515; A. Kjllgren, „On the 
Border of Abuse-The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on circumvention, fraud and other 
misuses of Community Law‟ (2000), European Business Law Review, 179-194; K.Sorensen, „Abuse of 
Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely Rhetoric?‟ (2006) 43 Common Market 
Law Review 423; P. Schammo, „Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in EC Legal System‟, (2008) 14 
European Law Journal 3, 351-376; R.de la Feria, „PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF (COMMUNITY) 
LAW: THE CREATION OF A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EC LAW THROUGH TAX‟, in 
(2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 395        
2    E.g., P. Schammo, „Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in EC Legal System‟, cit., 358-359; R.de la 
Feria, „„PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF (COMMUNITY) LAW: THE CREATION OF A NEW 
GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EC LAW THROUGH TAX‟, cit., 458-459.     
3              Although the ECJ, in the rulings analysed in the subsequent parts of this article, made 
reference to EC law, in the introduction, in the general discussion and in the conclusive reflections 
reference will be made to “EU law” to reflect the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force 
on 1 December 2009, replaced the name “European Community” with the name “European Union” and 
changed the name of the EC Treaty into “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (TFEU). 
In the text, reference will be made to “the Treaty” to indicate the TFEU, and the Treaty  Articles‟ 
numbers will refer to the Articles as they are numbered in the TFEU with indication, in footnote, of the 
original number of the same Articles in the EC Treaty (and, where relevant, in the EEC Treaty ante-
1992).       
4 P. Piantavigna, „Conference Report: Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU 
Law?3-4 October 2008, Oxford (UK)‟, in (2009) Intertax 37, 166-175, reporting a debate which took 
place at a symposium organised in Oxford. 
focusing, in particular, on two areas which, in the literature, seems to have provided 
scope for much controversy: the areas of EU company law and of EU tax law.  
Through a re-reading of the case-law, it is argued that, ultimately, a conceptual 
distinction emerges between “abuse” and “circumvention” and that, despite a partially 
different terminology, it is possible to reconcile the ECJ rulings issued in different 
areas – and particularly in two areas of company law and tax law - and, at the current 
stage of EU law, to identify a unitary notion of abuse of rights. It is furthermore 
argued that the unifying factor lies in the prejudice of the conduct at stake in the 
concrete cases for the interest of third parties.    
    For these purposes, par. 1 provides a general overview of the developments of the 
ECJ case-law concerning the abuse of right, whereas par. 2, 3 and 4 concentrate on  
ECJ‟s rulings which have been providing scope for much academic debate as regards 
their (in)consistency with one another, namely the ECJ‟s company law rulings 
concerning the freedom of establishment and on the ECJ‟s  tax law rulings. Par. 5 
assesses whether the concept of abuse of rights emerging from these rulings on their 
whole can be seen as a unitary one, and Par. 6 discusses whether it can be regarded as 
a general principle. The conclusion follows in Par. 7.         
        
1. The “entry” of the concept of “abuse of rights” in EU law 
 
     As it was observed, “the case-law on abuse of rights now cuts across the entire 
spectrum of EC law”5. The developments of the ECJ case-law which eventually 
resulted in the “entry” of the concept of abuse into EU law started with the 1974 Van 
Binsbergen
6
 ruling, concerning the freedom to provide services. In the situation at 
stake, a Dutch lawyer, after having been entrusted to act as legal representative before 
Courts in the Netherlands for a local party, had transferred its residence from 
Netherlands to Belgium during the course of the proceedings, losing its capacity to 
represent the party in question due to a Dutch requirement that legal representatives 
be permanently established in the Netherlands. The ECJ thus had to rule on the issue 
whether this requirement could be reconciled with the prohibition of all restrictions on 
freedom to provide services within the Community.  After recognising in general 
terms that a requirement, whereby the person providing the service must be habitually 
resident within the State where the service is to be provided, may - according to the 
circumstances - deprive Art. 56 of the Treaty
7
 of all useful effect
8
, the ECJ took into 
consideration the particular nature of the services. In this respect, it stated that specific 
requirements imposed on persons providing the services cannot be considered to be 
incompatible with the Treaty if they aim at applying professional rules of conduct 
where the person providing the service would escape the application of these rules by 
establishing himself in another Member State
9
. The rules at stake were justified by the 
general good (organisations, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision, liability), 
and were binding on all persons established in the State concerned. Consequently, the 
ECJ found that a Member State is entitled to take measures to prevent the exercise by 
a services provider whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its 
                                                 
5              P. Schammo, „Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in EC Legal System‟, cit., p. 359. 
6  Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, ECR 1299 
7              Which was numbered Art. 59 of the EEC Treaty at the time of the ECJ‟s ruling.  
8              Ibid, para. 11 
9              Ibid, para. 12 
territory of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 56 for the purpose of avoiding the 
professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established 
within that State
10
.                             
     Although the ECJ did not yet expressly use the word “abuse”, a first type of 
conduct was thus at stake: the resort to fundamental freedoms for a purpose – in the 
concrete case, that of avoiding professional rules of conduct – which is different from 
the purpose pursued by the Treaty articles granting the fundamental freedoms 
themselves. The specific situation was a kind of “U transaction” – i.e., establishment 
of its residence in another Member State by a national of a Member State whose 
activity is directed toward this Member State -   which was regarded as aimed at 
escaping national rules of conduct which would be otherwise applicable. Because the 
ECJ decision in this case made specific reference to the nature of the service involved 
and to the rules of conduct concerned, without statements of general character, this 
decision – whilst clarifying that Member States are entitled to take measures to 
prevent the conduct at stake – raised three interconnected key questions.  
   First, whether Member States would be entitled to take measures to prevent the 
circumvention of any type of national rules in whatever area.  Second, and in 
consequence, whether any conduct aimed at escaping national rules by using 
fundamental freedoms could be prevented by Member States. Third, and as an 
ultimate question, whether the key element in this conduct ought to be identified in 
the intention of escaping national rules or in the achievement of the concrete result of 
doing so with prejudice for third parties.  
    The Van Binsbergen case was followed not only by other rulings in the area of free 
movement of services, which reiterated its findings
11
, but also by a  number of rulings 
in other areas, namely the free movement of goods
12
, the free movement of workers
13
 
and the freedom of establishment
14
. These rulings made it clear that Member States 
are allowed to take measures to prevent situations of circumvention of national rules 
similar to that at stake in Van Binsbergen
15
  or to prevent other situations of use of 
rights conferred by the Treaty for improperly gaining benefits
16
. In these subsequent 
rulings the ECJ expressly started using the word “abuse” to indicate these situations17, 
                                                 
10  Ibid, paras. 12 – 13.   
11    As it occurred in three rulings concerning broadcasting services: Case C- 148/91, Veronica 
Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariat voor de Media [1993] ECR I-487, para. 12-13; Case C-211/91, 
Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-6773, para. 12;  Case C- 23/93, TV10 v. Commissariat voor de 
Media [1994] ECR I-4795, para. 21. 
12     Case  229/83, Leclerc v. Au ble vert [1985] ECR 1, para. 27  
13    E.g. Case  39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover [1988] ECR 3161, para. 4 
14    E.g. Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken  [1979] ECR 399, para. 25; 
Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, 
para. 24   
15     Case  229/83, Leclerc v. Au ble vert, para. 27; Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van 
Economische Zaken  [1979] ECR 399, para. 25; Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992], para. 24.    
16     Case  39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover [1988] ECR 3161, para. 43 
17     E.g., Case  39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover, cit. para. 43; Case C-370/90, The Queen v. 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, cit., para. 24: “..the facilities created by the Treaty 
cannot have the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from them to evade the application of 
national law and of prohibiting Member States from taking the measures necessary to prevent such 
abuse”.    
 
thereby implying that Member States are entitled to prevent the circumvention of any 
area of law when the circumvention amounts to abuse. Nonetheless, the key question 
whether any circumvention of national laws via the resort to rights granted by EU law 
(and in general, whether any improper use of rights granted by EU law) would 
amount to abuse, did not yet find the response. This response would have requested a 
test for identifying - in all its constituent elements – the notion of abuse applicable to 
the instances of avoidance of national law via the recourse to fundamental freedoms 
and to other situations of improper reliance on rights conferred by the Treaty.  
       Other rulings which involved not circumvention of national laws, but reliance on 
rights conferred by EU law provisions, provided the occasion for a further 
development of the ECJ case-law concerning the abuse of rights. In fact, in part of 
these cases – which involved preliminary references brought by Greek courts 
regarding alleged instances of abuse of provisions of Second Company Law 
Directive
18
 – the ECJ, in deciding whether the conduct at stake amounted to abuse, 
had regard to any inconsistency between the objectives of the Directive‟s provisions 
of which the parties involved aimed at benefiting and the conduct of the parties 
concerned
19
. Interestingly, in these cases the ECJ, whilst accepting the right of 
national courts to apply domestic anti-abuse rules, even where the rights of which the 
parties seek to benefit were granted by EU law provisions, made it evident that this 
right of national courts were subject to specific conditions: the national anti-abuse 
rules must not detract from the full effect and uniform application of EU law
20
, they 
must not alter the scope of the EU law provisions under consideration
21
, and they 
must not compromise the objective pursued by EU law provisions
22
. Through this 
insistence on the purpose pursued by the EU provision concerned, the ECJ adopted 
the teleological reasoning which – eventually – would contribute to its elaboration of 
overall test for identifying the concept of abuse.                     
     In fact, it was eventually in the 2000 Emsland-Starke ruling
23
, in the area of 
common agricultural policy,  that the ECJ for the first time laid down a twofold test – 
a subjective test and an objective test - for identifying the concept of abuse of rights. 
In the situation concerned, a German company, Emsland-Starke, had exported to 
Switzerland several consignments of potato-based products and had been granted the 
export refund provided for by Art. 10(1) of the EEC Regulation n. 2730/79
24
. 
Although the products had been released for home use in Switzerland, enquiries 
conducted by the German customs investigation services revealed that, immediately 
                                                 
18 Case C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis, [1996] ECR I-1347, Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v.Greece 
[1988] ECR I-2843, and Case C-373/97, Dionysio Diamantis v.Elliniko Dimosio  [2000] ECR I-01705, 
concerning the application of the Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 (“on the 
coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are 
required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second para. of Art. 58 of the 
Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited companies and the maintenance and alteration of 
their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent”, known as “Second Company Law 
Directive”), in OJ 1977, L 26/1.  
19    Case C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis, cit.,, para. 67 to 70; Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v.Greece 
cit., para. 21 to 23; Case C-373/97, Dionysio Diamantis v.Elliniko Dimosio, cit., para. 33 and 34. 
20    Case C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis, cit.,, para. 68 
21    Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v.Greece cit., para. 23 
22    Case C-373/97, Dionysio Diamantis v.Elliniko Dimosio, cit., para. 34   
23   Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke [2000] ECR I-1569   
24  Commission Regulation (EEC) 2730/79 of 29 November 1979 on the application of the system of 
export refunds on agricultural products, O.J. 1979, L 317/1.    
after the release for home use in Switzerland, the products had been transported back 
to Germany unaltered and by the same means of transport, which prompted the 
relevant German authority to revoke the decisions granting the export refund and to 
demand repayment. The Commission, which had intervened in the proceedings 
brought by the company against the decisions to revoke the export refund, had 
submitted that, whilst Regulation 2730/79 does not constitute a legal bases for 
demanding repayment of export refunds, the abuse of rights aspect had to be 
examined. In this respect, the Commission cited Council Regulation 2988/95 on the 
protection of EC financial interests, whereby “acts which are established to have as 
their purpose to obtaining of an advantage contrary to the objectives of Community 
law applicable in the case by artificially creating the conditions required for obtaining 
that advantage shall result, as the case shall be, either in the failure to obtain the 
advantage or in its withdrawal”25.     
      The Commission argued that this Regulation, whilst not applicable at the material 
time, expresses a general principle of “abuse of rights” already in force in the 
Community legal order
26
. The ECJ – after referring to previous rulings in the field of 
common agricultural policy, in which, without thoroughly defining the concept of 
abuse, it had held that the scope of EC Regulations must in no cases be extended to 
cover abusive practices
27
 - specified the elements that must exist in order for an abuse 
to be found. The ECJ stated: “A finding of abuse requires, first, a combination of 
objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid 
down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. It 
requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an 
advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down 
for obtaining it..”28. In light of these elements, the ECJ clarified, in the case at stake, 
that the company‟s obligation to repay the export refund was “not a penalty for which 
a clear and unambiguous legal basis would be necessary, but simply the consequence 
of a finding that the conditions required to obtain the advantage derived from the 
Community rules were created artificially, thereby rendering the refunds granted 
undue payments and thus justifying the obligation to repay them”29.  
   The Emsland-Starke ruling marked a decisive step in the development of the ECJ 
case-law on abuse of rights, from a dual viewpoint.  Firstly, it laid down a complete 
test for identifying the concept of abuse with regard to a conduct – namely, the access 
to rights (in the specific case, financial benefits) granted directly by EU law 
provisions – which does not involve the exercise of fundamental freedoms within the 
internal market, and which represents, therefore, a type of conduct additional to the U-
transactions in the exercise of fundamental freedoms (at stake in Van Binsbergern).   
In so doing, it went further than previous case-law
30
, by highlighting that a key 
requirement in order for this second type of conduct to amount to abusive practice lies 
in the artificial creation of conditions required to obtain a (financial) benefit granted 
                                                 
25  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95 of 18 December 1995, on the protection of the European 
Communities financial interests, O.J. 1995, L 312/1.  
26 Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 36 to 38. 
27  Case C-125/76, Cremer v.BALM 1977 ECR 1593; Case C-8/92, General Milk Products v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1993] ECR I-779  
28  Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 52 and 53 
29  Ibid, para. 56 
30 Such as the cases indicated above, in fn 17 and 18. 
directly by EU law. Secondly, regarding this type of conduct the Emsland-Starke 
ruling, by clearly showing that the subjective element is necessary but not sufficient, 
evidenced the importance of the link between the subjective element and the objective 
result. Specifically it highlighted that this link ultimately creates a dissociation 
between the form of a given behaviour – which form (objectively) fulfils the 
conditions for obtaining a benefit – and the substance of the behaviour itself, which 
substance (due to the artificiality of the behaviour, and to the underlying intention) 
does not meet the purpose of the EU provisions granting the benefit. The ruling 
further emphasized that this dissociation between form and substance would create a 
prejudice to the financial interests of the Community (as shown by the arguments put 
forward by the Commission) and of Member States, which prejudice needs to be 
prevented.  
   It can well be noted that the ECJ used the adverb “artificially” with reference to this 
second type of conduct (access to benefits granted directly by EU provisions), 
whereas, as regards the first type of conduct (i.e., the U-transactions characterised by 
the resort to a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, for the purpose of 
escaping national rules), it generally used (as in Van Binsbergern) the verbs “to 
avoid”, “to escape” or “to evade”31. Despite this difference in the language, it could 
be argued that using the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom to 
provide services or the freedom of establishment, for a purpose (escaping national 
rules) which is different in substance from the purpose of the Treaty provisions 
granting the fundamental freedoms themselves, amounts to an “artificial” use of those 
freedoms. In other words, the “artificiality” can be regarded as a common element of 
both types of conduct.  
   However, whilst Van Binsbergen showed that the artificial use of these freedoms 
could be prevented by Member States when the outcome was the circumvention of 
national rules intended to protect the general interests – and thus, impliedly, indicated 
that, in these cases, “circumvention” could be regarded as synonymous of “abuse” – a 
fundamental question remains unanswered by the ECJ case-law examined until this 
point: whether and, if so, in which cases, there can be “circumvention” without “abuse 
of rights” in the exercise of fundamental freedoms involving U-transactions. 
     The response – and the possibility of identifying a unitary notion of abuse – can be 
drawn, in the author‟s view, from the ECJ rulings in the company law area concerning 
the freedom of establishment of companies, and from rulings in the tax law area, 
which latter can also strengthen the relevance of the test laid down in Emsland Starke.  
.                    
                                                 
2. “Abuse of rights” in the company law rulings of the ECJ concerning 
companies’ freedom of establishment… 
 
      “U-transactions” similar to those at stake in Van Binsbergern came to the attention 
of the ECJ in the company law field too, with regard to the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment. Four landmark rulings  – specifically, the 1987 Segers ruling32, the 
1999 Centros ruling
33
, the 2003 Inspire Art ruling
34
, the 2006 Cadbury Schweppes 
                                                 
31 E.g., Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken , cit., para. 25.  
32 Case 79/85, Segers, [1986] ECR 2375  
33 Case C-212/97, Centros [1999] ECR I-1459 
34 Case C-167/01, Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10195 
ruling
35
  - give the clear indication that, whilst an “abuse” always presupposes a 
circumvention of the applicable national provisions, vice-versa a circumvention of the 
applicable national provisions does not necessarily result in an abuse.        
   In the situation at stake in the 1987 Segers ruling, a Dutch national, Mr. Segers,  had 
set up a private limited company in the UK, of which he was the sole shareholder and 
director. This company did not carry out any business activity in the UK – where it 
had its registered office – and all the business activity was carried on by a subsidiary 
established in the Netherland. The relevant Dutch authority had rejected Mr. Segers’s 
application of a sickness insurance scheme which, according to Dutch legislation, was 
reserved to directors of companies established in the Netherland.  Interestingly, 
against the Dutch authority‟s arguments according to which Mr. Segers intended to 
circumvent Dutch national rules, the ECJ found that the fact that the company did not 
carry out any business activity in the Netherland was immaterial on the ground that 
the company, having its registered office in the UK, met one of the conditions 
established by Art. 54
36
 for enjoying the right of establishment
37
. However, as regards 
the relevant Dutch authority‟s arguments, the ECJ -  by using both the word “abuse” 
and the word “fraud”, and by concluding that “the need to combat fraud may....justify 
a difference of treatment in certain circumstances…”38 but “the refusal to accord a 
sickness benefit….cannot constitute an appropriate measure in that respect”39 - 
indirectly suggested that there could be, in certain circumstances, cases of 
circumvention amounting to abuse or to fraud and which could be contrasted through 
appropriate measures.         
    Whereas the Segers ruling did not offer a reply to the question as to what would be 
the “certain circumstances” and the “appropriate measures”,  the subsequent Centros 
and Inspire Arts rulings showed “U-transactions” which the ECJ regarded as 
representing circumventions without abuse of rights and offered indications as regards 
the circumstances when the circumvention would amount to abuse. In Centros, 
Danish nationals had set up again a private company in the UK and this company had 
opened a branch in Denmark, where all business activity was deemed to be carried 
out. Although the relevant Danish authority had refused to register the branch on the 
ground that the Danish founders of the UK company had circumvented provisions of 
Danish company law requiring a minimum share capital for the purpose of protecting 
creditors, the ECJ rejected this position. The ECJ found that the refusal to register the 
branch would prevent the company established in the UK by the Danish nationals 
from exercising its freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty
40
, but – in its 
reasoning leading to this conclusion – it highlighted two decisive points. First, the 
ECJ, on the basis of its previous case-law concerning both the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms and the access to rights granted by EU law, specified that 
Member States “are entitled to take measures designed to prevent some of their 
nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly 
to circumvent national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or 
                                                 
35 Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995 
36 Which was numbered Art. 58 (of the EEC Treaty) at the time of the ECJ ruling. 
37 Case 79/85, Segers, cit., para 16.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
38 Ibid., para. 17  
39 Ibid. 
40 Case C-212/97, Centros, cit. para. 21 
 
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law”41.  The wording 
“improperly to circumvent” indirectly suggests that, in addition to cases of improper 
circumvention of national rules – which Member States are entitled to contrast and 
which, arguably, indicate cases of abuse – there may be cases of  “proper” (intended 
as not abusive ) circumvention of national rules via the fundamental freedoms. As a 
result, it could also suggest that individual Member States should not contrast these 
cases without contravening the purpose of the Treaty‟s provisions granting the 
fundamental freedoms themselves. In fact, in this respect, the ECJ held that national 
courts, whilst able to take account of the abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of 
the persons concerned to deny them the benefit the EU law provisions on which they 
seek to relay, must assess such conduct in light of the purpose pursued by the EU law 
provisions at stake
42
. Second, the ECJ took into consideration the fact that the rules 
which the parties sough to avoid were rules concerning the formation of companies 
and not rules concerning the carrying on of certain trades, professions or businesses 
and had regard to the specific purpose of the Treaty‟s provisions granting the right of 
establishment. On these grounds, it held that the fact that a national of a Member State 
wishing to set up a company chooses to form it in a Member State whose rules of 
company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in other Member 
State cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment
43
. Moreover,  
by restating a conclusion of the Segers ruling, the ECJ also found that the fact that a 
company does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it had its 
registered office but only in the Member State where the branch is established is not 
sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct which would entitle 
the latter Member State to deny the company the benefit of the right of 
establishment
44
. Lastly, in light of the need to protect creditors which had been 
invoked by the Danish authorities as justification, the ECJ noted that the Danish 
measure did not meet the proportionality requirements which are necessary in order 
for any measure restricting the right of establishment to be legitimate
45
. The ECJ took 
this position for two reasons. On the one hand, it stressed that the refusal to register a 
branch was not such as to attain the objective of protecting creditors
46
.  It could be 
noted that, in highlighting this aspect, the ECJ seemed to indicate that, without 
negative effects for the protection of creditors, there can be no abusive conduct, 
despite the choice of a less restrictive company law regime for setting up the company 
that would then carry out all activity through a branch in another Member State. On 
the other hand, the ECJ pointed out that creditors were able to know that the company 
was governed by the law of a Member State other than Denmark and were able to 
refer to certain rules of EU law protecting them
47
, such as the Fourth and the Eleventh 
Company Law Directives
48
.                                          
                                                 
41 Ibid, para. 24  
42 Ibid, para. 25. 
43 Ibid, para. 27 
44 Ibid, para. 29 
45 Ibid, para. 34-35 
46 Ibid, para. 35 
47 Ibid, para. 36 
48 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 on annual accounts of certain types of 
companies, in OJ 1978 L 222, p. 11, and Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 
1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect of  branches opened in a Member State by certain 
types of companies governed by the law of another State, in OJ 1989 L 395, p. 36      
    The ECJ concluded by remarking again that the fact that a Member State may not 
refuse to register a branch of a company established in another Member State does not 
preclude the first Member States from adopting other measures for combating fraud, 
either in relation to the company itself or in relation to its members, where it has been 
established that they are attempting, by establishing a company in another Member 
States, to evade their obligations towards public or private creditors in the territory of 
a Member State concerned
49
.  
    If the Centros ruling – a case of circumvention (i.e., “U-transaction”) - without a 
finding of abuse -  is read together with  Van Binsbergen
50
, it appears that the ECJ has 
drawn a distinction based on two elements: a) the type of national rules that were 
being circumvented; b) the ultimate outcome of the circumvention, i.e. the effect of 
generating a prejudice for third parties‟ interests.   
   Arguably, the ECJ has been ready to state that the circumvention can be prevented 
by Member States – and seems thus to have impliedly equated circumvention with 
abuse – where the rules being circumvention were rules assumed to protect the 
general public interest (Van Binsbergen) whereas it has not regarded the 
circumvention as sufficient to prove abuse where the rules being circumvented, via 
the exercise of the right of establishment, were national rules concerning the 
formation of  a company and assumed to protect the specific interests of creditors. By 
taking Van Binsbergen  together with Segers and Centros, it emerges therefore – as 
regards the ultimate outcome of the circumvention – that in the former case the ECJ 
impliedly took for granted the prejudice for the general interests, whereas in the two 
latter cases the ECJ requires that the prejudice for the specific interest of the 
concerned third party be proved. The evasion of the obligations towards public or 
private creditors – the reason, highlighted by the ECJ, which would allow Member 
States to adopt measures to combat fraud
51
 – would, by definition, compromise the 
interests of creditors. By analysing the ECJ overall reasoning in Centros, and in 
particular by noting that the ECJ referred to “abuse or fraudulent conduct”52, attention 
can be paid to the fact that the ECJ would seem to have expressly focused on the 
attempt to evade the obligations towards public and private creditors only when 
referring to fraud
53
. Accordingly, it can be inferred that a subtle distinction can be 
drawn in the ECJ's reasoning, between “abuse” and “fraud” and that, whereas in cases 
of “abuse” the prejudice to the interests of creditors is the effect, in cases of “fraud” it 
is the searched purpose.       
     It follows that, without a prejudice for third parties‟ protection (either supposed to 
exist or to be proved, according to the kind of rules which are being circumvented), 
there can be “circumvention” with neither “abuse” nor “fraud”, and that an 
“innocuous” circumvention is the case where preventing the circumvention on its own 
would imply preventing the resort to the freedom of establishment and thus defeating 
the very purpose of Arts. 49 and 54 of the Treaty
54
.  
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   Whereas in the subsequent Inspire Art ruling the ECJ confirmed and strengthened 
the findings in Centros, in Cadbury Scwheppes it took a position which part of the 
literature found difficult to reconcile with the one in Centros. 
     In Inspire Art, the ECJ had to examine again the case of a Dutch national who had 
set up a company in the UK, which company carried out all its business activity 
through a branch in the Netherlands. Unlike the Danish authorities in Centros, the 
Dutch authorities in Inspire Art did not refuse to register the branch of the UK 
company, but required it to comply with some substantive measures of Dutch 
company law, amongst which the minimum capital requirement. The justifications put 
forward by the Dutch Government were the protection of creditors, the need to 
combat improper recourse to freedom of establishment, the protection of effective tax 
inspections and fairness in commercial dealings. The ECJ found again that, as regards 
the protection of creditors, this purpose could be sufficiently achieved because the 
company involved held itself out as a company governed by English law, thus giving 
creditors sufficient notice that it was governed by a legislation other than that of the 
Netherland and offering them the protection of the Fourth and Eleventh Company 
Law Directives
55
. As for the improper use of the right of establishment, the ECJ, by 
recalling its Centros findings, regarded the company‟s incorporation in another 
Member State offering a less restrictive regulation as inherent in the right of 
establishment, and thus considered its carrying out of business activity only through a 
branch in the Member State of “secondary” establishment as insufficient on its own to 
prove abuse or fraud
56
. In turn, the Dutch justifications based on the fairness of 
business dealings and efficiency of tax inspections were rejected on the ground that 
no evidence had been produced to prove that the Dutch provisions met the required 
criteria of efficacy, proportionality and non discrimination
57
. In conclusion, the ECJ 
clearly found that abuse must be established on a case-by-case basis and that, where 
abuse is so established, Member States are free to take measures to prevent it
58
.  
     Overall, the Inspire Art ruling thus confirmed that circumvention of national rules 
via the freedom of establishment does not in itself amount to abuse when the 
protection of third parties’ interests are not at stake, and that – only where Member 
States prove that this protection is being compromised – they can take measures to 
prevent the circumvention/abuse by restricting the freedom of establishment if no 
other less restrictive measure can be considered.                          
  
3….and in a ruling concerning both company law and tax law: the Cadbury 
Schweppes ruling 
 
    The Cadbury Schweppes ruling owes its importance, in the context of the 
development of the concept of abuse of law, on the one hand to the fact that it is at the 
same time a company law ruling and a tax law ruling, and on the other hand – from 
the company law viewpoint - to the fact that the ECJ specified the ultimate purpose of 
the Treaty‟s provisions on the freedom of establishment. In the situation at stake, a 
UK company had set up a subsidiary in Ireland for the purpose, inter alia, of having 
the subsidiary‟s profits taxed at the Irish corporate tax rate, which was substantially 
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lower than the applicable UK corporate tax rate. Whilst the UK tax authority, 
according to UK law, had applied its national CFC legislation (by attributing to the 
UK parent company the profits accrued to the Irish subsidiary), the ECJ – in assessing 
the incompatibility of UK CFC tax legislation with EU law – stated that Arts. 49 and 
54 of the Treaty
59
, by granting the right of establishment, have the ultimate purpose of 
assisting economic and social interpenetration within the internal market through a 
genuine economic activity in the host State, i.e. in the State of the secondary 
establishment
60
. This purpose could not be achieved – the ECJ specified -  in the case 
of a “letter-box” or “front” subsidiary, which does not carry out any economic activity 
in the host State
61
. On these grounds, the ECJ reached the conclusion that the CFC 
legislation was incompatible with Arts. 49 and 54 of the Treaty and could thus not be 
applied, unless that application serves only to prevent wholly artificial arrangements 
intended to escape the national tax normally payable
62
. Consistently with its overall 
reasoning, the ECJ specified that CFC legislation must not be applied where, on the 
basis of objective factors which the interested company must be allowed to 
demonstrate, and which must be ascertainable by third parties, it is proven that, 
despite tax motives, the subsidiary is actually established in the host Stage and carries 
out a genuine economic activity
63
. The objective factors which must be demonstrated 
relate to the existence of the subsidiary in terms of premises, staff and equipment
64
.                                     
   Whilst the importance of Cadbury Schweppes from the company law perspective 
lies in the fact that the ECJ clearly specified that “letter-box” or “front” subsidiaries 
are not covered by the Treaty provisions on the right of establishment, its importance 
from the tax law viewpoint lies in the circumstance that – by making reference to this 
case of  subsidiaries not carrying on genuine economic activities – the ECJ explained 
the meaning of the expression “wholly artificial arrangements”, that it had already 
used in several previous tax law rulings
65
. By applying the test laid down in Emsland-
Starke
66
, the ECJ stressed in fact that, for a wholly artificial arrangement to exist, 
“there must be, in addition to a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain 
a tax advantage, objective circumstances showing that, despite formal observance of 
the conditions laid down by Community law, the objective pursued by the freedom of 
establishment …” (i.e., assisting economic and social interpenetration within the EU 
through a genuine economic activity in the host State) “..has not been achieved”67.     
    Cadbury Schweppes thus showed the application of the same test (including the 
subjective and the objective elements) for identifying the abusive practices from one 
area of EU law to another, and clarified that, in the field of tax law, wholly artificial 
arrangements – such as the setting up in other Member States of subsidiaries not 
carrying on genuine economic activities - are synonymous of abuse. Consequently, 
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from Cadbury Schweppes it is also possible to deduce that a “U-transaction” - such as 
the creation of a subsidiary, by a national of Member State A, in Member State B for 
tax savings reason, and the fact that the activity of the subsidiary is mainly directed 
towards Member State A - amounts to circumvention which is not “wholly artificial”,  
i.e., which is not abuse, if the subsidiary carries on some genuine activity in Member 
State B.     
   Nonetheless, the fact that, in Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ considered in principle 
he case of “letter-box” and “front-subsidiaries” as falling within the “wholly artificial 
arrangements” that Member States can combat – and thus, impliedly, within the 
concept of abuse – gives rise to the question whether and how Cadbury Schweppes 
can be reconciled with the Centros findings.  Taking into consideration the fact that, 
in Centros, the (parent) company in the UK had only the registered office there and 
was arguably the kind of “letter-box” or “front” company that, according to Cadbury 
Schweppes, a subsidiary could not be, part of the literature has found it difficult to 
reconcile the two rulings and has thus seen a change in the ECJ-case-law
68
. However, 
in the author‟s view, it is possible to reconcile the two rulings by having regard to the 
consequences of the arrangements at stake in the concrete cases for third parties‟ 
interests. This perspective shows, in fact, the similarity of the concept of abuse in the 
company law field and in the tax law field, despite a different terminology: the choice 
of a more favourable company law legislation (“forum-shopping”), via an “U-
transaction”, is not on its own sufficient to prove abuse without a proven prejudice to 
the protection of specific third parties‟ interests (such as creditors, in Centros) to the 
same extent as the choice to exercise the freedom of establishment in a Member State 
with a more favourable tax legislation than the Member State of origin is not 
sufficient to prove abuse (i.e., to prove a “wholly artificial arrangement”), but can 
become so if the absence of a genuine economic activity in the host Member State 
shows that the only objective (and outcome) consists of a prejudice to the financial 
interest of the Member State of origin (Cadbury Schweppes). In addition, the two 
rulings could not be seen as inconsistent with each other if considering that, in 
Centros, the secondary establishment in Denmark used to carry on a genuine 
economic activity, and would have thus met the requirement of not being a “letter-
box” or “front-subsidiary” (branch) which the ECJ set out in Cadbury Schweppes  to 
identify the cases when the use of the freedom to set up secondary establishments is 
protected by the Treaty due to its not being an “abusive practices”.     
    The concept of abuse as wholly artificial arrangement resulting in a prejudice to the 
financial interest of a Member State was confirmed, and specified in greater detail, in 
the Lammers
69
 ruling. Belgian tax authority, by applying a national anti-abuse 
provision, had reclassified interest paid by a Belgian subsidiary on funds lent by the 
parent company established in another Member State as taxable dividends as these 
interest payments exceeded specific limits. The Belgian tax legislation thus 
introduced a difference in treatment between resident subsidiaries according to 
whether or not their parent companies has its seat in Belgium, and the ECJ – 
consistently with its previous case-law – regarded this differential treatment as 
creating a restriction to the freedom of establishment on the ground that it made less 
attractive for companies based in other Member States to create a subsidiary in 
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Belgium.  Although a national measure creating this restriction to the freedom of 
establishment could be justified – the ECJ explained – when targeting wholly 
artificial arrangements designed to circumvent national legislation of the Member 
States concerned, “in order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be 
justified on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of 
such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly 
artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping 
the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national 
territory”70. 
   This statement on the one hand confirm that in the ECJ tax case-law abusive 
practices coincide with wholly artificial arrangements, on the other hand makes even 
more explicit than in Cadbury Schweppes the outcome of prejudicing the financial 
interests of Member States which, without a corresponding economic activity, makes 
an arrangement abusive. Consequently, in the author‟s view, it is possible to reconcile 
Centros and Inspire Art on the one hand with Cadbury Schweppes and Lammers on 
the other hand, by noting that the ECJ has simply been expressing the distinction 
between mere circumvention and abuse with a different approach. On the one hand, in 
Centros and Inspire Art
71,  it has done so with a “positive” language, by indicating, in 
essence, when a circumvention is allowed and by specifying that it is allowed when it 
does not cause a prejudice to third parties‟ protection. On the other hand, in Cadbury 
Schweppes and Lammers, it has done so with a “negative” language by indicating, 
ultimately, when a circumvention – “wholly artificial arrangement” – is not allowed 
and by clarifying that it is not allowed when it only causes a prejudice to the financial 
interests (tax revenues) of the Member State of origin, which is the case in the 
absence of a genuine economic activity in the host State.       
   Other ECJ tax law rulings show the concept of abuse which emerges as regards the 
first typology of conduct too, i.e. as regards the attempt to create artificially the 
conditions required for obtaining benefits granted directly by EU tax law provisions.    
 
4. Abuse of right in other tax law rulings of the ECJ  
 
    The definition of abuse put forward in Emsland-Starke
72
 was used again by the ECJ 
in the 2004 Leusden ruling
73
, concerning a case of interpretation of the Sixth Value 
Added Tax (VAT) Directive (hereinafter: VAT Directive)
74
. In a situation in which an 
amendment to the implementing national legislation had withdrawn the right to opt 
for taxation of lettings of immovable property,  which would have allowed him to 
enjoy a tax advantage due to the deduction of input tax, the concerned taxpayer had 
argued that the repeal of legislation from which he had derived an advantage in 
paying less tax constituted a breach of legitimate expectation. The ECJ, in finding that 
the repeal of this legislation from which a taxpayer had derived this advantage, 
without there being an abuse, cannot breach a legitimate expectation based on EU 
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law, recalled the concept of abuse and, in so doing, it literally repeated the subjective 
element and the objective element already indicated in Emsland-Starke
75
. Moreover, 
in stating that “as regards tax avoidance…  under the law of a Member State, a 
taxpayer cannot be censured for taxing advantage of a provision or a lacuna in the 
legislation which, without constituting an abuse, has allowed him to pay less tax…”76, 
the ECJ arguably accepted the conceptual difference between abuse and elusion with 
regard to cases in which the issue at stake is the access to tax advantages granted 
directly by the EU or by the national legislator, without the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms.  Emsland-Starke was thus deemed to provide the framework also for all 
cases in which the conduct under examination is the access to tax advantages granted 
directly by the legislator.  
    In fact, in the 2006 Halifax ruling, concerning again the VAT Directive
77
, the ECJ 
spelt out for the first time
78
 the definition of the concept of abuse in the taxation field.  
A British banking company, who was able to recover less than 5% of its input VAT, 
needed to construct call centres in different sites. Following the advice of its tax 
advisers, the company had entered into an overall set of agreements involving several 
transactions as between companies belonging to its own group. As a result of these 
arrangements, it had managed to entirely deduct the VAT paid on invoices received 
from its suppliers for construction works. The ECJ was essentially asked two 
questions, closely interconnected with each other: a) whether transactions carried out 
by each participator with the intention solely of obtaining a tax advantage and which 
have no independent business purpose qualify for VAT purposes as supplies made by 
or to the participants in the course of their economic activities; b) whether the doctrine 
of abuse of rights as developed by the ECJ case-law prevented the company from 
recovering the input VAT. 
   The ECJ, in light of the wording of the VAT Directive and of its previous case-law 
– in which, by analysing the definitions of “taxable person” and “economic 
activities”, it had found that these terms are objective in nature and apply without 
regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned – gave a positive 
response to the first question. Specifically, it stated that the transactions at issue 
constituted supplies of goods and an economic activity within the meaning of the 
VAT Directive, provided they satisfy the objective criteria on which those concepts 
are based. This applies – the ECJ specified – even if they are carried out with the sole 
aim of obtaining a tax advantage, without any other economic objective
79
.  
    Nonetheless, the fact that the transactions may constitute supplies under the terms 
of the VAT Directive even if they are carried out with the sole aim of obtaining a tax 
advantage does not mean – as the ECJ specified in answering the second question – 
that EU legislation can cover abusive practices. In particular, the ECJ, after recalling 
its settled case-law whereby the application of EU legislation cannot be extended to 
cover abusive practices, i.e. to transactions carried out not in the context of normal 
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commercial transactions but only for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages 
provided for by EU law
80
, found that the principle of prohibiting abusive practices 
also applies to the sphere of VAT
81
. 
     With this premise, the ECJ moved from its previous case-law in the VAT area, 
according to which a traders‟ choice between exempt transactions and taxable 
transactions may be based on a range of factors, including tax considerations, to agree 
with the A.G. that taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their 
tax liability
82
. However, the ECJ followed this line of reasoning for highlighting the 
difference between an acceptable limitation of tax liabilities and an abusive practice, 
and for identifying, on the basis of Emsland-Starke, the concept of abuse applicable in 
the VAT field too. In this respect, the ECJ specified that two conditions must exist for 
the abuse to be found: a) first, the transactions concerned, despite formal application 
of the conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the VAT Directive and its 
national implementing legislation, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of 
which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions; b) second, objective 
factors must show that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a 
tax advantage
83
.  Whereas the element sub a) impliedly presupposes the subjective 
element, i.e. the intention of obtaining the tax advantage, the element sub b) is the 
objective factor that was already pointed out, in a different wording, in Emsland-
Starke (“despite formal observance,…..the purpose has not been achieved)84.  
    However, by comparing Emsland-Starke with Halifax, it can be easily noted that, 
whereas in Emsland-Starke the ECJ did not specify whether the purpose of obtaining 
the advantage ought to be exclusive or essential and thus, impliedly, appeared to 
suggest that this ought to be the exclusive purpose, in Halifax – by specifying that the 
obtaining of a tax advantage ought to be the essential aim – it admitted that a 
transaction could still constitute an abuse if the aim of obtaining the advantage is not 
the only one but is the most important one. The doubts as to whether the obtaining of 
the tax advantage ought to be the sole purpose or the essential purpose, and as to 
whether it could be possible to talk of a “general EU principle of prohibition of 
abuse” in the direct tax area too, as such binding on Member States, could well be 
raised after the 2007 Kofoed ruling
85
, concerning the application of Directive 90/434 
(“Merger Directive”) which provides for tax exemption for restructuring operations 
within the EU
86
. In a situation in which income tax was charged on an exchange of 
shares with particular features and in which national legislature had not enacted 
specific measures to transpose Art. 11(a) of the Merger Directive, which contains an 
anti-abuse clause
87
, the ECJ had to decide whether such an exchange of shares 
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whether the tax authorities could react to possible abuse of rights, by taxing the 
transaction, despite the lack of implementation of the Directive‟s anti-abuse clause.  
   After having analysed the operation and found that the exchange of shares in 
question was covered by the Merger Directive and thus could not, in principle, be 
taxed, the ECJ – by making reference to its previous case-law regarding both the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms (such as Centros and Cadbury Schweppes) and the 
access to rights conferred by EU law provisions (such as Halifax) -  stated: “Art. 11(a) 
of Directive 90/434 reflects the general Community law principle that abuse of rights 
is prohibited. Individuals must not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of 
provisions of Community law. The application of Community legislation cannot be 
extended to cover abusive practices, that is to say, transactions carried out not in the 
context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully 
obtaining advantages provided for by Community law”88.  In one of its previous 
rulings on the Merger Directive, the Leur-Bloem ruling
89
, the ECJ had already 
emphasized that Member States may set a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance, 
and may apply this anti-abuse clause of the Merger Directive (by denying the 
application of the tax relief provided for by the Directive), when the restructuring 
operations are not carried out for valid commercial reasons
90
. Arguably, the fact that 
the ECJ in Kofoed has stated that a provision, such as the anti-abuse clause of the 
Merger Directive, which expressly aims at contrasting “tax evasion” or “tax 
avoidance”, reflects the general principles of prohibition of abuse of rights, seems to 
make a conceptual distinction between abuse, evasion and avoidance irrelevant from 
the practical viewpoint. In fact, it suggests that any form of wrongful (i.e. undue) 
access to tax benefits –  whether the purpose is to obtain them via illegal devices91 or 
via operations which conform to the letter but not to the goals of the provisions
92
 -  
can be prevented by Member States.         
     Nonetheless, the wording used by the ECJ in Kofoed, “solely for the purpose of 
wrongfully obtaining advantages”, could certainly raise the question whether it was to 
be read together with the fact that the sole purpose of obtaining tax advantages had 
been highlighted by the Member State concerned or whether it expressed the general 
principle, and, in this second case, it could raise the doubt whether/how it could be 
read together with the “essential purpose” of obtaining tax advantages as stressed in 
Halifax. Moreover, in Kofoed the ECJ indicated, as regards the second issue (whether 
tax authorities could react to possible abuse of rights in the absence of implementation 
of the anti-abuse clause of the Directive), that it is for national courts to ascertain 
whether there is in national law a provision or general principle prohibiting abuse of 
rights or other provisions on tax evasion or tax avoidance which might be interpreted 
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in accordance with the anti-abuse clause of the Merger Directive and therefore justify 
its application
93
. In so doing, the ECJ indirectly found that the EU law principle of 
abuse of rights cannot be directly applied in the absence of a domestic anti-abuse 
provision, thus raising the further question as to whether a distinction needs to be 
drawn, regarding the relevance of this principle, between indirect taxation (Halifax) 
and direct taxation (Kofoed) .               
    In a subsequent ruling, Part Service
94
, the ECJ had to the clarify the relation 
between the essentiality of the purpose of obtaining the tax advantage as condition set 
out in Halifax and the exclusivity of this purpose, as highlighted in Kofoed and other 
rulings.  
   In the case at issue, related parties, which were involved together in leasing 
arrangement transactions, had decided to conclude separated contracts with the 
clients, thus dividing the supply in a number of parts, rather than concluding an 
ordinary leasing contract. This division of the contracts had the effect of reducing the 
VAT burden to a lesser amount than that resulting from an ordinary leasing contract, 
as some of the resulting transactions felt under the scope of the exemption from VAT 
provided for in the Italian legislation implementing the VAT Directive. The Italian 
Supreme Court, before which the national tax authority had submitted its argument 
that the leasing arrangement had been artificially dividend to reduce the VAT burden, 
had thus identified the key issue in the question as to whether the division of 
transactions regarded in economic practice and in national case-law as essential parts 
of a leasing contract can constitute an abuse. Consequently, it had raised before the  
ECJ two interconnected questions: a)  whether in the VAT Directive the concept of 
abuse of rights defined in Halifax as transactions the essential aim of which is to 
obtain a tax advantage correspond to the definition of transactions carried out for no 
commercial reasons other than a tax advantage or is broader or more restrictive than 
that definition, and b) whether, for the purposes of VAT, the transactions at issue 
could be considered to be an abusive practice.       
  The ECJ, after noting that, in connection with the exemptions from VAT, the VAT 
Directive requires Member States to prevent “any possible evasion, avoidance or 
abuse”, explained that, in its Halifax ruling, it had only indicated the essentiality of 
the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage as the minimum thresholds for classifying a 
practice as abusive, which minimum threshold is thus passed in cases of transactions 
having the sole purpose of obtaining the advantage
95
. It therefore replied to the first 
question by stating (again) that the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning 
that there can be an abusive practice where the accrual of the tax advantage 
constitutes the principal aim of the transaction at stake, and it replied to the second 
question by leaving the determination of the existence of an abusive practice to 
national courts in light of criteria that the ECJ provided in Part Service itself
96
.  
   In fact the ECJ, after repeating its general statement (already formulated in Halifax) 
whereby taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their tax 
liability, found that, where a transaction involves a number of services, the key 
question is whether it should be considered as a single transaction or as several 
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individual and independent supplies of services
97
. In this respect, it specified that in 
certain circumstances several formally distinct services must be considered to be a 
single transaction where they are not independent from each other, i.e. when they 
form, objectively, a single indivisible economic supply which would be artificial to 
split
98
. The ECJ clarified that, once established that this is the case, the national courts 
– in order to identify an abusive practice - must verify, first, whether the result sought 
is a tax advantage which would be contrary to one or more objectives of the VAT 
Directive and, second, whether that constitutes the principal aim of the approach 
adopted by the parties
99
.                                         
   Part Service thus confirmed the borderline between elusion and abuse in the VAT  
field
100
: whereas the minimisation of tax liability via the use of alternative 
possibilities or the exploitation of gaps left by the legislator can be regarded as an 
acceptable elusion of one of the provisions at stake, the artificiality of the transactions 
and the contrariety of the tax advantage sough as main purpose to one of the expressly 
stated objectives of the provisions constitute the elements of abuse.  Arguably, the 
concept of elusion that can be referred to the legitimate minimisation of the tax 
burden is thus different from the concept of “avoidance” that under the VAT 
Directive Member States must prevent, together with the “abuse”, when granting 
exemptions.   
    The case-law does not appear to identify this concept of “avoidance”, but, having 
regard to the constituent elements of the abuse concept, in the author‟s view it may be 
inferred that a subtle distinction between “avoidance” and “abuse” (both forbidden) 
can be drawn based on the existence or not of an artificial transactions, which 
artificiality must exist in the abuse and is not necessary in the avoidance. The 
contrariety of the tax advantage to the objective of the VAT Directive provisions on 
exemptions or on particular operations must arguably, by definition, exist in both 
cases, because this element can, on its own, negatively affect the EU (and Member 
States) financial resources. On the other hand, if accepting that the contrariety of the 
tax advantage to the objectives of the Directive characterises the avoidance which the 
Directive requires Member States to prevent, the distinction also emerges between 
this concept of “avoidance” and the concept of “elusion/circumvention” which can 
simply be referred to the exploitation by the taxpayers of lacunae left by the legislator 
and to the minimisation of tax liability via the resort to different possibilities allowed 
by the legislator. 
      Although this distinction might be called into question on the ground that a 
prejudice to the financial interest of Member States as a main element exists both in 
the “avoidance” and in the “elusion/circumvention”, it could well be argued that, in 
this second case, unlike in the “avoidance” situation, leaving the taxpayers the 
possibility of reducing its own tax burden is ultimately the result of legislator's own 
choices. This can certainly explain why the “elusion/circumvention” situation cannot 
be properly regarded as a “prejudice” to revenue interests and thus as illegal and 
subject to prohibition.   
 
   5. Different concepts or unitary concept? 
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100 Borderline which can already be deduced from Leusden and Halifax (supra, in the text).    
    If the concept of abuse or abusive practice used by the ECJ in the cases concerning 
the recourse to fundamental freedoms, namely to the freedom of establishment, is read 
together with the cases of access to tax benefits granted by EU law provisions, it may 
appear questionable whether or not the overriding concern underlying the ECJ‟s 
reasoning coincide or is different in the two types of situations. 
   It might in fact be submitted that, on the one hand, the concept of abuse which was 
spelt out in Emsland Starke, Halifax and Part Services finds its roots in the protection 
of the financial interests of the EU, to the same extent as the so-called anti-abuse 
clause of the Merger Directive
101
 and of other tax directives
102
 find their roots in the 
protection of the financial interests of Member States, whereas on the other hand the 
concept spelt out in Cadbury Schweppes and in other cases concerning the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms would appear to be implied in the notion itself, e.g., of freedom 
of establishment. Following this line of reasoning, the purpose of the applicable rules 
would be the decisive factor for reconciling these rulings
103
. As the purpose of the 
freedom of establishment is to make it possible a genuine economic interpenetration 
within the internal market, a wholly artificial arrangement which does not lead to this 
integration cannot benefit from the freedom of establishment. In other words, it might 
be argued that in the first range of situations (access to tax advantages, which affect 
the EU‟s financial resources or the Member States‟ financial resources) an 
autonomous principle of abuse of rights exists in EU law, whereas in the second range 
of situations there is no such principle but there is simply a consequence – the lack of 
protection under EU law for wholly artificial arrangements - deriving from the 
purpose itself of fundamental freedoms. From this viewpoint, it might well be 
submitted that, when the exercise of fundamental freedoms is at stake, there is simply 
an application of the “rule of reason test” which has been elaborated by the ECJ case-
law in the landmark Cassis de Dijon ruling
104
 in the area of free movement of goods: 
specifically, this tests consists of recognising that there are overriding reasons of 
public interest which can justify restricting the use of fundamental freedoms, and a 
“rule of reason” test would be used, for this purpose, to protect the financial interest 
of Member States  in cases of wholly artificial arrangements, by regarding these 
arrangements as abusive
105
.   To put it differently, in this second range of cases the 
abuse would be not a principle, but an inevitable way of interpreting the use of the 
fundamental freedoms for reasons other than achieving their own purpose (which 
would not affect the EU financial resources). In a still different terminology which has 
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been used by in scholarly debate, whereas in the case of access to financial or tax 
benefits granted by EU law there would be a “general principle of abuse”, in the case 
of resort to fundamental freedoms the prohibition of abuse would only be a “principle 
of interpretation”106.    
     However well grounded these arguments may be from the viewpoint of the 
overriding concern underlying the lack of protection under EU law for the two 
categories of conducts at stake, two realisations seem to be inevitable. 
     First, the ECJ has expressly used the wording “abusive practices” for both 
typologies of conducts alike, and an adverse effect for the financial interest of a 
Member State inevitably arises both in case of undue access to tax advantages granted 
by EU law such as by the tax directives and in cases of wholly artificial arrangements 
intended to circumvent (thus to escape) the otherwise applicable national tax law of 
that Member State through the resort to the freedom of establishment. From this 
perspective, the fact that the ECJ, in its case-law concerning the access to tax benefits 
granted directly by EU law provisions, has made reference to previous rulings 
concerning the freedom of establishment too
107
, and vice-versa
108
, certainly appears to 
be unsurprising.     
    Second, if the two typologies of conduct are considered not from the perspective of 
the underlying concern but from the perspective of the behaviour of economic agents, 
it can easily be realised that the elements of the behaviour which is regarded as 
abusive practice tend to coincide
109
. In fact these elements are in any case, 
irrespective of whether the agent aims at obtaining a tax advantage or at benefiting 
from a fundamental freedom: a) the artificiality of the operation, which formally 
satisfies the required conditions for accessing the benefit but substantially does not; b) 
the purpose of obtaining of the benefit, whether tax advantage or access to 
fundamental freedoms; c) as a unique result deriving from obtaining the benefit, the 
prejudice to the interest of either the third parties or the tax revenues; and in 
consequence d) the contrariety of this outcome to the purpose of the provisions 
granting the advantage or to the fundamental freedoms provisions. The lack of one of 
these elements would make it impossible to classify the practice as abusive practice.  
E.g, the element c) was lacking in Centros and in Cadbury Scwheppes, for in Centros, 
the ECJ was not ready to uphold the Danish legislation restricting the freedom of 
establishment in the absence of a proven prejudice to the interest of the third parties 
involved (creditors) to the same extent as in Cadbury Schweppes it was not ready to 
uphold the UK CFC legislation without a demonstration that the only outcome of the 
establishment of the subsidiary in Ireland had been the prejudice to the UK revenues 
interests. On the contrary, element c) was supposed to be present in Halifax as it could 
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but depend on the behaviour of economic agents).      
be noted from the ECJ‟s guidelines110, although the ECJ left to national courts the task 
to ascertain the abusive practice.  
    On a first reading, whilst these constituent elements characterise an abusive 
practice as regards both the access to tax (or other financial) advantages granted 
directly by EU law and the use of the fundamental freedoms, a difference between 
these two situations may be identified. Specifically, this difference may be seen in the 
fact that the ECJ, in Halifax and Part Services,  has clarified that, in case of access to 
tax advantages granted by EU law provisions (the VAT Directive in those cases),  the 
minimum thresholds for regarding a practice as abusive lies in the essentiality of the 
purpose of obtaining the tax advantage, whereas the rulings concerning the access to 
fundamental freedoms, in identifying wholly artificial arrangements as abusive 
practices, it has been referring to “wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect 
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on profits generated 
by activities carried out on national territory”111. It might be argued that, in so doing, 
the ECJ has left it unclear whether, in order for a wholly artificial arrangement to 
exist, the purpose of escaping the normally applicable tax needs to be exclusive or can 
only be essential.  
    Nonetheless, in the authors‟ view, it is possible to infer that, even in these cases, 
there are indications that the essentiality of the purpose of escaping the normally 
applicable tax is sufficient for a “wholly” artificial arrangement to exist. This can be 
inferred from the fact that, in Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ ruled that the CFC 
legislation was inapplicable, in case of genuine economic activity in the host State, 
despite the existence of tax motives for the secondary establishment there, and from 
the recognition, in Lammers, of the possibility for Member States to verify the 
objective element “..in order to determine whether the transaction….represents, in 
whole or in part, a purely artificial arrangement, the essential purpose of which is to 
circumvent the tax legislation of that Member State..”112. Taking the two statements 
together, it can be easily argued that an arrangement is not abusive as long as tax 
motives, however existing, do not constitute the essential reason (as the essential 
reasons lies in the carrying out of a genuine economic activity). By contrast, when 
tax-savings motives become the essential reason the arrangements no longer 
correspond to primarily economic integration related reasons and becomes “wholly 
artificial”.  
   Consequently, irrespective of whether the notion of abuse is to be regarded as a 
concept in the case of access to benefits granted directly by EU law provisions 
(including the right to deduction of input tax granted by the VAT Directive in the 
field of indirect taxation) or as an implication of the rules themselves in the case of 
exercise of fundamental freedoms (involving the assessment of the legitimacy of 
national direct taxation rules when hindering this exercise), an overall argument can 
be submitted. Specifically, it is possible to argue that the notion is a unitary one from 
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the viewpoint of the behaviour of the economic agents (behaviour which contradicts 
the purpose of the provision from which the operator seek to benefit) which attracts 
consequences which are unfavourable to the agents themselves (the impossibility of 
accessing the financial/tax benefits granted by EU law provisions, or of resorting to 
the fundamental freedoms). As a result, to search the difference between the two 
situations, and between one area and another, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
way of ascertaining whether a conduct is abusive, i.e. on how to establish the 
existence of an abusive conduct.  
     In this respect, taking into consideration the statements of the ECJ concerning the 
proof that there is or that there is not an abusive conduct on the one hand in Halifax 
and on the other hand in Cadbury Schweppes, it can be noted that, whereas in the 
former case the ECJ limited itself to pointing out that national courts must assess 
whether there is abuse
113
, in the latter case the ECJ stressed that the company 
concerned must be given the opportunity to produce evidence that the activity in the 
host State is a genuine one, and thus that there is no wholly artificial arrangements 
intended to circumvent the applicable national tax legislation
114
.  
In other words, it would appear that, regarding the taxation field, a difference might 
be found between the access to benefits granted by EU tax provisions and the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms. In the former situation, the burden of proving the abuse lies 
on national tax authorities, whereas in case of exercise of fundamental freedoms, the 
ECJ wording in Cadbury Schweppes suggests that it is for companies to prove that 
their case deserves to escape the application of anti-abuse provisions, at least when 
those provisions are of a nature (such as CFC legislation) that they would 
automatically be applied if the company does not demonstrate that the situation at 
issue does not fall within the notion of abuse. On the contrary, the Centros and Inspire 
Arts rulings suggest that, regarding the company law area, in case of exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms the burden of proof of abusive practice lies on Member States 
which must demonstrate the existence of abuse on a case-by-case basis
115
.                         
 
 6. A unitary general principle, or a principle of interpretation?  
 
          The above analysis, which has ultimately argued the existence of a unitary 
notion of abuse of rights, has been carried out from the perspective of the two possible 
kinds of situations involved, namely the access to (financial or tax) benefits granted 
directly by EU law provisions on the one hand, and the use of fundamental freedoms 
on the other. These possible situations, corresponding to the two types of conducts 
that have been considered,  apply “horizontally”, i.e. to several areas and specifically: 
 the access to benefits applies both in the field of indirect taxation (Halifax, 
Part Services) and in the field of direct taxation (Leur Bloem, Kofoed), and it 
also applies in the common agricultural products field (Emsland-Starke); 
 the recourse to fundamental freedoms applies in the field of direct taxation 
(Cadbury Schweppes, Lammers), of company law (Centros, Inspire Art) and 
of other free movement provisions, such as the provision of services
116
.        
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    The question thus remains open as to whether a unitary notion, to be described 
either in terms of general principle, or of principle of interpretation, or with a sui 
generis definition, can be also deduced from the perspective of individual areas, i.e. 
through a “vertical” analysis by distinguishing an area from another. It appears to be 
generally accepted that a “general principle” of EU law can be elaborated by the ECJ 
when it applies in most, even if not in all, Member States
117
 and that the 
distinguishing features of general principles of EU law lies in the fact that, in addition 
to having a role as interpretative aids and “fillers of gap” in the legislation, they can 
also act as overriding rules of law
118
, as reflecting underlying overriding concerns. 
Accordingly, a “general EU principle of prohibition of abuse of right” would not 
need, unlike a mere principle of interpretation, national anti-abuse provisions or 
principles.       
     In the area of indirect taxation, Halifax and Part Services undoubtedly show that, 
in the cases when the criteria for identifying abuse indicated by the ECJ are met – 
which cases must be identified by the national courts – access to tax benefits provided 
for by the VAT Directive must be denied, without the need for individual Member 
States to set specific anti-abuse clauses. In this area, the prohibition of abuse of rights 
can thus be already regarded as a (directly applicable) general principle alongside 
other principles such as equality and legal certainty. In turn, the distinguishing feature 
of the VAT area lies in the fact that the financial interests of the EU are directly 
affected and that the provisions which are aimed at taking into account these financial 
interests are EU law provisions, exactly as it also occurs in the common agricultural 
policy field (Emsland-Starke).    
      In the area of direct taxation, on a first reading the ECJ wording in Kofoed – 
according to which it is for national courts to verify if there is in individual Member 
States a principle or a provision prohibiting the abuse of rights, and it is up to Member 
States to set national anti-abuse provisions
119
 – would seem to have a clear 
implication.   In fact, as the ECJ appeared to imply that EU law principle of abuse of 
rights cannot be directly applied in the absence of a domestic anti-abuse provision, 
and it was dealing with the application of the Merger Directive, it would seem to be 
inevitable to infer that the prohibition of abuse of right does not have, in the field of 
direct taxation, the same relevance of general principle as it has in the field of indirect 
taxation, even where the situation involves the access to tax reliefs granted directly by 
EU law. This would be so, despite the fact that the ECJ itself in Kofoed  referred to 
the prohibition of abuse of rights as a general principle.   
      Nonetheless, this interpretation of Kofoed can no longer be supported if the 
reasoning of the ECJ in Kofoed is considered in its entirety and is taken together with 
the purpose underlying the anti-abuse clause of the Merger Directive. In fact, in 
Kofoed the ECJ assessed what is sufficient in order for a Directive to be introduced in 
a national legal system and, in so doing, stated that an express reproduction of the 
Directive wording in national provisions is not necessary for a Directive to be 
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regarded as implemented
120
. Moving from this premise and with regard to the anti-
abuse clause of the Merger Directive, the ECJ could not but conclude that it is for 
national courts to verify if in the national system there is either a provision or a 
general principle prohibiting abuse
121
, by which, ultimately, the ECJ meant that it is 
(obviously) for national courts to verify if the anti-abuse clause of the Directive has 
been implemented. Consequently, where the anti-abuse clause has not been 
implemented,  either through the reproduction of relevant Directive‟s provision or 
through any other device,  the impossibility for tax authorities to react to situations of 
abuse is the result of a choice of national legislators: the wording of the anti-abuse 
clause of the Merger Directive clarify that Member States may -  rather than must – 
withdraw the benefits of the Directive in cases of operations carried out without valid 
commercial reasons
122
. Moreover, this option (rather than the obligation) for Member 
States to set a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance, and to apply the abuse-abuse 
clause of the Merger Directive (by denying the application of the tax relief provided 
for by the Directive) when the restructuring operations are not carried out for valid 
commercial reasons, was emphasized by the ECJ wording in Leur-Bloem
123
. 
Accordingly, the ECJ position in Kofoed appears to be consistent with the one in 
Leur-Bloem, i.e., in essence it appears to be a consequence of the fact that the anti-
abuse clause of the Merger Directive (and of the other tax directives) does not impose 
Member States to withdraw the application of the benefits of the Directive, which 
depends on the fact that this anti-abuse clause was set to protect the financial interests 
of Member States.  
      It can therefore be argued that the ECJ's reference in Kofoed to the general 
principle of abuse of rights as expressed in the anti-abuse clause
124
 is not inconsistent 
with the fact that a national anti-abuse provision is needed, simply because, in the 
case of the Merger Directive, the financial interests to be directly safeguarded are the 
interests of Member States, rather than the interests of the EU. The final choice as to 
whether/how to safeguard their own financial interests is thus left to Member States, 
who can decide whether the introduction of national anti-abuse provisions is the 
appropriate means to protect these interests.  
   It is thus possible to explain the ECJ‟s description of the prohibition of abuse of 
rights in Kofoed in terms of a general principle, and, in so doing, to reconcile the 
rulings concerning indirect taxation and access to financial benefit
125
 with the ruling 
concerning direct taxation regarding access to direct tax reliefs
126
, by asserting that 
the prohibition of abuse of rights can be characterised as “a general principle of EU 
with a sui generis aspect”. Whereas it can be regarded as having the features of a 
general principle from the viewpoints of its being common to most Member States
127
 
and of the underlying, overriding concern of preventing improper use of rights, the sui 
generis aspect would seem to lie in the fact that it has been developed by the ECJ, and 
has “entered” EU law, to protect a range of different interests, and that this affects its 
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applicability.  Specifically, its applicability is a direct one when the interests that the 
principle aims to protect are the EU financial interests (indirect taxation and access to 
financial benefits granted by EU law provision), whereas it is left to Member States 
when the principle (as expressed in the tax Directives anti-abuse clauses) serves to 
protect Member States' financial interests, and thus to avoid that a prejudice to 
Member States' revenues be the only outcome of the operations at stake. The same 
interpretation proves to be valid for direct taxation in relation to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms: when the only/main outcome of the exercise of the freedoms 
(due to the lack of genuine economic activity) is the prejudice to the financial interests 
of Member States they can restrict the freedom by setting anti-abuse clauses such as 
CFC.  This reading is not contradicted by several previous tax rulings concerning both 
companies and individuals, in which the ECJ had stated that the loss of tax revenues is 
not one of the grounds listed in Art. 52 of the Treaty
128
 and cannot be regarded as an 
overriding reason in the public interest that Member States can use to justify a less 
advantageous treatment for cross-border situations than for domestic ones
129
: in fact, 
these rulings can be easily reconciled with Cadbury Schweppes by arguing that the 
ECJ statement under consideration applies to situations of genuine economic activity 
in the host State.      
In turn, as indicated above the outcome of the exercise of the fundamental freedoms in 
cases of circumvention of national rules – in terms of existence or not existence of a 
prejudice for the interests of third parties as a sole outcome of the exercise of the 
freedom  – is also the decisive element in the company law area: only where such a 
prejudice is proved on a case-by-case basis (Centros, Inspire Art) and no less 
restrictive means to prevent the prejudice is available, the Member State concerned 
can restrict the right of establishment. In this regard, the circumstance that, in Inspire 
Arts and in a previous company law ruling concerning companies‟ right of 
establishment via the transfer of the head office from one Member State to another, 
the 2002 Uberseering ruling
130
, the ECJ mentioned, amongst the interests whose 
protection could justify a restriction to the freedom of establishment, the effectiveness 
of fiscal supervision
131
 and even more specifically the interests of taxation 
authorities
132
, appears to be significant.  In fact, the fact that the interests of the 
taxation authorities have been mentioned in a company law ruling suggests once more 
that the abuse concept (and the prohibition of abuse principle) applying in the 
company law area and in the broad tax law area is a unitary one – and that it comes 
into play when a prejudice needs to be avoided - even from the viewpoint of an area-
by-area analysis.                           
    Ultimately, if accepting that the reason behind the elaboration of the prohibition of 
abuse of rights in the EU legal order lies in the need to strike the balance between the 
prejudice to the public interest (including revenues interests) or to specific interests 
(e.g. creditors‟ interests) and the integration goals of the Treaty, and consequently that 
it lies in the necessity to prevent the prejudice to the interests involved when this 
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prejudice emerges as the main (or the sole) element,  a final question can be raised 
and answered. Specifically, it can be discussed whether the prohibition of abuse of 
rights emerging from the ECJ case-law tends to show a parallelism with the abuse of 
rights provision laid down in Art. 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, under 
which “Nothing…shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity 
or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent then is provided for 
herein”. As this provision refers to the rights enshrined by the Charter itself and is 
addressed to EU institutions, to bodies, offices and agencies of the EU and of Member 
States when implementing EU law (as made clear by Art. 51 of the Charter), it would 
appear on a first reading to have a different significance and scope from the abuse of 
right concept emerging from the ECJ case-law and discussed in this paper, which 
latter concept refers to the conduct of the right holder when he aims at accessing a 
benefit granted by EU provisions or at exercising a fundamental freedom. The 
difference between the abuse of rights prohibition enshrined in Art. 54 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the abuse of rights concept that has been analysed would 
thus seem to lie both in the addressees and in the scope. Nevertheless, the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty
133
 has given the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same 
legal force as the Treaty on the European Union and as the EC Treaty, renamed 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
      For this reason, in the author‟s view a teleological interpretation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and of the TFEU in light of each other appears to be appropriate 
for consistency of the EU legal order. Adopting such an interpretation, Art. 54 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights could be regarded as prohibiting rights from being 
abused, due to the abuse causing a prejudice to the victim of the conduct at stake
134
. It 
could also be noted that such prejudice needs to be regarded as unacceptable, at least 
when emerging as the main or sole outcome of a specific conduct, in light of the very 
objectives of social cohesion
135
, that are listed amongst the ultimate goals of the EU 
exactly by the Treaty which provides the legal basis for EU provisions directly 
granting benefits as well as for the fundamental freedoms.  
    Ultimately, it can thus be submitted that the prejudice to other parties‟ interests is 
the feature which shows the parallelism between the principle of abuse of rights 
developed by the ECJ case-law and the prohibition of abuse of rights concept set out 
by Art. 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.       
              
 
  7. Conclusion 
 
     The arguments put forward in the analysis carried out in the parts 2 to 5 can be 
ultimately summarised, at the current state of EU law, in the following table: 
 
  Areas of law                                              Types of conduct 
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  Direct access to benefits 
provided by EU law  
Exercise of a fundamental 
freedom 
Indirect tax area Prejudice to the EU 
financial interests (VAT 
Directive): prohibition of 
abuse of rights as directly 
applicable general 
principle 
 
 
Direct tax area Prejudice to the Member 
States financial interests 
(direct tax directives): 
prohibition of abuse of 
rights applicable to the 
discretion of Member 
States (via national anti-
abuse clauses)  
Prejudice to the Member 
States financial interests: 
prohibition of abuse of 
rights as justification for 
restrictions of the freedom 
of establishment if no 
genuine economic activity 
is carried out, which needs 
to be proved  (“rule of 
reason approach”) 
Company law area 
 
 
 
Prejudice to the specific 
interests of third parties: 
prohibition of abuse of 
rights as justification for 
restrictions of the freedom 
of establishment if 
prejudice is proved on a 
case-by-case basis in 
situations of circumvention 
of national rules protecting 
specific interests 
 
 
Common agricultural 
policy 
Prejudice to the EU 
financial interests: 
prohibition of abuse of 
rights as directly applicable 
general principle 
 
Provision of services  Prejudice to the general 
public interest: abuse of 
rights as directly applicable 
general principle as 
prejudice is presumed in 
cases of circumvention of  
national rules of conduct 
set to protect the public 
interest 
      In the present work, it has therefore been stressed that the existence of the 
prejudice (to either Member States' financial interests or the general public interest or 
to specific interests)  makes it possible to find a unitary notion from both the 
perspective of the types of conduct involved and the perspective of the different areas, 
and that this aspect is bound to be the ultimate outcome in cases of artificial conduct 
(i.e., of creation of the formal conditions for obtaining benefits without the underlying 
required economic substance or resort to freedoms without genuine economic 
integration).     
      As a result, taking the concept of abuse of rights developed by the ECJ case-law, 
and capable of being regarded as a general principle (with a sui generis aspect), which 
has been here analysed with particular regard to the areas of company law and tax 
law, together with the concept embodied in Art. 54 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights
136
,  a conclusion seems to be inevitable.  Specifically, it can be concluded that 
the two concepts
137
 – due to the fact that they differ from each other not in the 
substance, but only from the viewpoint of the scope of rights embraced and from the 
viewpoint of the actors of the conduct under consideration – are complementary to 
one other in ensuring that, within the framework of the EU legal order on its whole, 
rights of whatever nature can be abused by neither public bodies nor right holders.                 
 
  
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 Retro, part. 6. 
137 Or, perhaps more accurately, the two sphere of application of the same concept. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
